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Introduction
Th is paper outlines the major policy

di在erences

between the post-Stalinist reform in the former

USSR and China (Section 1). It then briefly presents the dramatic contrast in outcomes in the two cases
(Section 2). Th e usual explanation is to suggest that the two systems had radically different starting
points , with large differences in their respective capacities for 'catching up , forging ahead and falling
behind' , to use the terminology of Abramowitz (1 986).

China's 'succes s.' is seen as mainly due to

'special' factors such as the strength of its historical traditions of 'capitalism' and the advantages enjoyed
on account of the impact of Hong Kong and Taiwan. Th e USSR's failure is seen largely in terms of its
'special' problems such as the greater strength of nationalism or the more conservative na.ture of the
commumst party.
Section 3 is the main-focus of this pape r. It examines this proposition in detai l. It concludes that
despite some important differences the two systems in fundamental respects possessed large 'catch-up'
possibilities. Indeed , it is far from obvious that China overall possessed greater 'catch up' possibil ities
than the USSR. Th e contrast in outcomes was largely caused by differences in policies selected. Th is
applies both to economic policy and to the wider question of the relationship between political and
economic reform.
1 have not encountered a
programme who has said

'恥地 got

sinσle
。

Western author who was involved in the Russian reform

the advice radically wrong'. Anders Aslund , a famous foreign advisor

to both Gorbachev and Ye1tsin was asked in late 1992 whether he 'would do anything different now'.
He answered : 'Not really. 1 have been in favour all along of a very liberal solution for Russia. And
the failures suggest that one has to go in a more liberal direction , as quickly as possible' (TransitioD ,
November , 1992: 5).

1.

Contrasting approaches to the political economy of reform
China's reform of the Stalinist system of political economy began with the arrest of the Gang of

Four following Mao Tsetung's death in the Autumn of 1976. In the former Soviet Union the reforms
did not really begin until 1985 when Gorbachev was elected General Secretary of the CPSU. In both
cases the reform involved a complex set of issues in both the political and the economic sphere.
Th e contrast in approach in the two cases is striking. Th e Chinese leadership was determined

not to allow any semblance of national disintegration. Th e national government fought a harsh campaign
against the separatist movement in Tibet and it made the reintegration of Hong Kong and Taiwan into the

Mainland a central focus of foreign policy. While the regime moved away from the depths of totalitarian
intervention in social life , it remained an authoritarian one-party state. Serious political opposition was
dealt with brutally , most notably in the case of the Tiananmen massacre of 1989. Th e government
believed that political democratisation was a diversion from the most important task , namely that of
improving the performance of the economic system in order to raise living standard and make China a
more powerful and respected country. 1ts position was made starkly clear by Deng Xiaoping in his key
speeches in the late 1970s: 'In the China of today we can never dispense with leadership by the Party and
extol the spontaneity of the masses.. .I n 1966 the Chinese economy , having gone through a few years of
readjustment , was in a position to develop rapidly. But Lin Biao and the Gang of Four did it grave
damage. Only now ... has our economy returned to the road of sound growth. If a handful of people
are allowed to kick aside the Party committees and make trouble , the four modernisations will vanish into
thin air' (D eng , 1992:

“

-9).

1t approached the task of improving the performance of the Stalinist economic system in an
extremely cautious fashion. It had no blueprin t. Its most striking characteristic was experimentalism.
Price reform went slowly , so that still in 1990 only about one half of retail sales and around one-third
of industrial means of production were sold at a free market prices. Large changes took place in the way
industrial enterprises operated. However , in the early 1990s the vast bulk of industrial output still was
produced in state or local community owned enterprises , with the purely 'private' sector playing only a
small role. Not a single state enterprise of any size went bankrupt during the reform period. A massive
'decollectivisation' of farmland operation took place , but farmland remained in local community
ownership. Th e economy remained largely shielded from international competition. 1t was not for
nothing that the Chinese leadership by the early 1990s was characterising their economic system as a
'socialist market economy'.
Under Gorbachev , economic reform followed a remarkably similar path to that in China. 1t also
began experimentally with similar hesitations and anxieties among the different factions in the leadership.
1n the 'reform wave' of 1987-88 a number of Chine
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Th is 'reform wave' took place only three years after Gorbachev came to power 1 •
Th e crucial difference between the Chinese approach and the Soviet approach to reform under

Gorbachev lay in the conception of what constituted a desirable path of economic reform and what the
relationship was between this and political reform.

From as early as July 1986 Gorbachev had

determined that a successful economic reform needed to proceed much more rapidly than the pace at
which Soviet reforms were proceeding. He decided that this required a prior radical political reform:
'In the summer of 1986 , it became clear that Gorbachov had changed his strategy .... [H]e turned to
'perestroika' of the political system' and his language was radicalised .... Apparently , Gorbachev had
concluded that he could not implement a viable economic reform without breaking the entrenched political
resistance and for that he needed a political reform , raising the pressure from below' (Aslund , 1991: 3334).
Almost without exception Western commentators and advisors believed this to be a correct
evaluation of the logic of the reform process. Th e notion that gradual reform of the planned economy
was infeasible due to the authoritarian nature of the communist party was a central plank of Kornai's
extremely influential criticism ofthe 'Th ird Way'. Kornai (1966) is scathing in his criticism ofthe 'naive
reformers' who bel ieve that a communist party can preside over a process that h 己

considers

will inevitably

lead to its own demise.
A chorus of trenchant criticisms was made of the Chinese communist party in the 1980s , arguing
that the introduction of a market economy was impossible under communist rule: 'To survive and
successfully evolve as a living social organism , the system of free markets , private property , and
contractual buyer-seller transactions must operate within a legal order and in a politically democratic
environment' (p rybyla , 1990: 188? It was felt widely that the CCP could not itself make the transition
to secular rational rule.

It had the double burden of highly centralised traditions of Leninism plus

millenia of centralised rule in China. Th e conventional wisdom , espoused in article after article and
conference after conference was that the CCP had to be removed from its monopoly of political power

A comparable stage in China's post-Stalinist reforms would be the late 1970s. At this point China
had made less rapid progress in its reforms than the USSR had done by the late 1980s. The key decision
to move ahead with fundamental system reform in China was not made until December 1978 , and even
then the early reform measures following this were extremely cautious. As late as the Spring of 1979
a major campaign was fought 益型旦旦出 e policy of agricultural contracting to the group , which had been
cautiously begun the previous yea r. In hindsight one frequently forgets the slow pace and great care with
which the reforms were introduced in China.
2

Th e fact that this proposition was contradicted by the experience of almost all the industrialising

countries in the nineteenth century doesn't seem to bother Prybyla nor most other eco nomists who entered
the fray of the political debate over economic reform in the former communi st countries.
3

if the move to a market economy was to be put into

e叮叮t:

'Deng Xiaoping tried to restart China's economy without affecting the dictatorship of its
entrenched vanguards ... A1though the term had not yet been invented , Deng sought

perestroika without

glasnost.

前lis

is not a particularly unusual project.

Th ere are

innumerable examples of similarity placed monopolists of political power who wanted
economic modernisation without political reform ... lt does not work ... lnstead of
duplicating South Korea and Taiwan, China seemed to have taken as its model Ferdinand
Marcos's Philippines' (J ohnson, 1990: viii-x).
In contrast , there was a chorus of praise form the West for Gorbachev's far-sighted vision and
daring in moving the USSR rapidly towards mu 1tiparty democracy (the CPSU's monopoly of political
power was formally ended just four years after Gorbachov began the programme of political perestroika.
Aslund's view is representative of a large number of Western writers: 'To break the power of the party
and state bureaucracy might be seen as the key problem of a reform. lt is difficult to perceive any othe rsolution than a far-reaching democratisation with a strong popular pressure and openness balancing the
bureaucracy' (Aslund , 1991: 14).
Only in hindsight did some of writers begin to acknowledge the dangers of the path that had been
followed , and even then in the most equivocal terms: '[T]o be

e仔'ective ，

far-reaching economic reform

must ultimately be accompanied by political reform. Admittedly , there is a danger that the political
reforms may come too fast and lead to anarchy, but a refusal to relax politically is an equally serious
threat to the overall success of any reform effort'(Goldman, 1992: 65). The tentative, experimental
economic reforms ofthe late 1980s were completely swamped by the effects of political perestroika. The
communist party collapsed. Th e nation state disintegrated and a feeble , populist government was brought
into being. Th e budgetary situation quickly became hopeless. Th e money supply ran wildly out of
contro l. A disastrous spiral of withdrawal from the market was set in motion at every level from the
republics down to the enterprise, and the system relapsed into a virtual barter economy. From heaving
a relatively low level of indebtedness, the USSR rapidly moved towards becoming one of the world's
most indebted countries, as the foreign trade situation careere

4

the first two years of the post-Gorbachev period have been dominated by efforts to develop large powers
for the presidency. As this arti c1 e is being written (J une 1993) a constitutional congress is under way in
Moscow which seems Ii kely to provide Yeltsin with executive powers greatly in excess of those even of
the French or US presidents. Th e 'justification' for this great increase in the powers of their president
is that only in this way can the radical economic reforms finally be pushed ahead , which it is promised
will lay the foundation for future prosperity for the country. Moreover , in the
Congress of

Pωples'

e仔örts

to by-pass the

Deputies , Yeltsin is apparen t1 y prepared to grant even greater powers to the

repub Ii cs and regions that make up the Russian Federation , threatening the po 1i tical disintegration of what
remains of Russia. Stanislav ShataIi n, the author of the famous 'One hundred days' programme of
transition to a market economy is quoted to have said: 'We are being 0叮叮 ed something very strange and
perhaps even terrible - the political traditions of Tsarist autocracy and Bolshevism' (reported in the
Observer , 16 May , 1993).

2.

Contrasting results
ln almost a11 key aspects of institutional arrangements and policy China's post-reform economy

in the 1980s appears as the kind of interventionist half-way house that most economists would predict
would perform very badly. Th roughout the decade private property 'rights existed in only a minor

pa口

of the economy; the government continued to intervene heavily in price setting; the economy remained
substantially isolated from the impact of world prices; the communist party continued to rule in a
sometimes brutal and always authoritarian fashion , and intervened at a11 levels of the economic process.
lndeed , some observers

believed 出 at

'market socialism' was too charitable description of this system and

that 'market Stalinism' was more appropriate.
ln fact , in the first decade or so of reform China's economic performance was much better than
under Maoist policies. Th e rate of growth of national output accelerated sharply (Table 1). China's
system of authoritarian political control enabled her to control population growth , despite the bulge in
the reproducing age cohorts in the 1980s , and in per capita terms the annual growth rate of net national
output more than doubled. A striking shift occurred in the pattern of growth , away from that which is
characteristic of a Stalinist economy. Th e overall industrial growth rate , which was already very rapid
under Maoism , changed little. However , there were important changes in the efficiency in resource use.
ln state-run industry , there was a sharp reversal of the long-run de c1 ine in productivity which China had
experienced in the Maoist years (Chen , et al , 1988 , Jeferson , et al , 1990(a) and 1990 (b)) , and China's
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state owned enterprises began to behave in a cost-minimising fashion 3 • Moreover , the typical Stal inist
relationship between the growth rate of heavy and light industry was reversed with explosive growth of
light industry. Th e agricultural growth rate accelerated much ahead of that achieved during the Maoist
period , and with much more economy in resource use.

China outperformed almost all developing

countries in terms of output growth and export performance (T able 1). Moreover , it remained relatively
unburdened by foreign debt and achieved fast growth with relatively low inflation.
It cannot be argued that growth in 出 e 1980s was achieved at the expense of popular consumption.
Th e 1980s saw a revolution in all aspects of real incomes. A remarkable improvement occurred in the

Chinese population's diet , with large easily observable improvements in the quality of produce. A vast
new fashion industry sprung up in the textile sector. A huge increase occurred in consumer durable
consumption , mainly met from domestic production , with huge new industries springing up where
formerly there had been virtually nothing. Housing space per person more than doubled over the course
of a decade. Large improvements took place in the availability of professional health care. A massive
transformation occurred in the number and variety of services available. The reported improvement in
the already exceptional figures for life expectancy and mortality rates (Table 1 ) suggests that the growth
in living standards affected most social strata , even if there was greater inequal ity in consumption than
under the extreme egalitarianism of Maoism.
Th e disintegration of the USSR in the late 1980s led to a collapse also of proper statistical

reporting. Any estimates are of only the roughest magnitude. Table 2 provides an extremely crude view
of the picture as portrayed by one standard source. It shows a crisis of massive proportions , comparable
in scale

to 出 e

awful downturn in production in China after the Great Leap Forward4 • The consequences

for personal incomes have not yet subject to proper statistical analysis. However , a mass of anecdotal
evidence and personal observation support the conclusion that for a large fraction of the population ,
probably well over one-half, the period since the late Gorbachev years has seen a serious deterioration
in living standards , alongside a large rise in income for a small fraction

0

Th is is the conclusion of the study of 200 state owned firms during the years 1983-87 undertaken
by Hay and Liu (1 992).

In fact , unofficial estimates of output suggest that the downturn began before 1989 , and there may
well have been negative growth of national product over the whole 1985-1990 period (Aslund , 1991 ,
200).
6
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Table 1: Comparative Economic Performance of the Chinese Economy in the 1980s

Av annual growth
rate , 1980/89(%):
GDP
Agricul ture
lndustry
Services
Av annual real growth
rate of exports , 1980/89(%)
Av annual growth rate
of population , 1980/89(%)
Av annual rate of
inflation , 1980/89(%)
Debt service as % of
exports of goods and
servlces
: 1980
: 1989
Index of av p.c. food
consumption , 1987/89
(1979/81 = 100)
Daily calorie intake
p.c.
: 1965
: 1988
Crude death
rate(no/ 1000) : 1965
: 1989
Infant mortal ity
rate(no/ 1000) : 1981
: 1989
Life expectancy at
birth(years)
: 1981
: 1989

Low income
countnes
(1)

Middle income
countnes

China

lndia

9.7
6.3
12.6
9.3

5.3
2.9
6.9
6.5

3.4
2.5
3.1
4.4

2.9
2.6
3.0
2.8

1 1. 5

5.8

0.8

5.5

1. 4

2.1

2.7

2.1

5.8

7.7

14.9

73.0

4.6
9.8

9.1
26 .4

1 1. 4
27 .4

26.1
23.1

128

113

103

101

1931
2632

2103
2104

1960
2182

2482
2834

10
7

20
11

21
13

13
8

71
30

121
95

124
94

81
51

67
70

52
59

50
55

60
66

Note(l) exduding lndia and China
Source: World Bank , 1983 and 1991
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Table 2: Selected Economic Indicators for the Former USSR (all output data and data on retail trad
turnover are at constant prices)
1989

1990

1991

1992* 1993*

N et Material
product

100

96.0

80.7

64.5

58.1

Gross
industrial output

100

98.9

90.9

77.3

68.0

Gross
agricultural output

100

97.7

87.9

80.0

75.2

Retail trade
turnover

100

110 .4 99 .4

59.6

53.6

Consumer prices
(% change on
previous year)

5.0

8.0

2 ,500

1,000

150

Notes *estimates , for Russia only
Source Economist Intelligenc Unit , Country Report , CIS (for merly USSR) , no 4 , 1992.
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economic performance is continuing simultaneously with a slide back into authoritarianism , so that in the
medium term , at least , Russia seems to have obtained a perilous deterioration of economic performance
and in the quality of daily life alongside a re-appearance , though under much more anarchic conditions ,
ofpolitical authoritanism. Th ese results are so di 旺'erent ， so important for the people of the two countries ,
and of such large significance for wider issues of economic analysis , that it is imperative to have a correct
evaluation of their causes. Th e following section attempts to evaluate the degree to which this result can
be attributed to

di叮叮 ences

in inherent system possibilities for 'catch up'.

3.

A comparison of the capacity for 'catch up' possessed by the two systems
end of the Stalinist period.

3.1

Th e economic inheritance

a.

Size

at 出e

China and the USSR enjoyed a considerable advantage compared to the other reforming Stal inist
economies on account of their vast size. Th is meant that they both had a greater possibil ity to restructure
without loss of efficiency behind protectionist barriers. Domestic industries could potentially move
towards profitability at wo r1 d market prices within a relatively c1 0sed economy with growing internal
competition and yet simultaneously benefit from economies of scale. 1n this respect they each possessed
the potential to take the nineteenth century 'American' way to industrial prosperity behind protectionist
barriers producing for a massive domestic market of continental dimensions 5 •
b.

The labour force

General educational level
Th e socialist ideals of the communist countries was reflected in their deep commitment to the

provision of equality of access to education , especially for primary and secondary school age children.
China's level of general education in the 1970s was very advanced for a low income country
(fable 3). 1ndeed , the proportion of the relevant age groups in primary and secondary placed the country

around the middle income leve1. 1n the late 1980s the mean years of schooling of the Chinese population
aged over 25 stood at 4.8 , which was the same level

as 出 at

for middle income countries , and stood at

more than double the figure reported for low income countries (U NDP , 1992)(2.3 years). 1n normal

Th e USA's

tari旺 rates

(average unweighted average) for manufactured imports were as follows:
1820=40% , 1875=40-50% , 1913=25% 仰o r1 d Bank , 1991: 97).
9

times 6 the quaIi ty of China's basic education was impressive compared to other developing countries.
Th e World Bank summarised the situation in the late 1970s as follows: ' About 72 % of those who enter

primary schools in China complete four years of education as compared with 41 % in 1ndia , 68 % in
1ndonesia , and 38 % in Brazil ,... the achievements of Chinese children in such basic subjects as
mathematics are on average ahead of those in most other countries' (w orld Bank , 1981:

“

-7).

Th e Soviet Union's achievements in basic education compare favourably , with those of the

advanced capitalist countries (T able 3).

1ndeed , estimates for the mid-1970s using international

purchasing power parity dollars show the USSR to be ahead of all Western countries except the USA in
'consumption' of education a1 services per capita (Schroeder , 1983: 319).
Higher education

China took a strategic decision to place high emphasis within full time education upon the primary
and secondary schoollevel. 1n 1978 only one per cent of the relevant age group were studying in higher
education a1 institutions , compared to 2 % in lower income countries as a whole , and 8 % in lndia (Table
3). Moreover , during the Cultural Revolution higher educational institutions were closed for much longer
than lower levels: 'Th e Cultural Revolution is estimated to have cost China 2 million middle level
technicians and one million university graduates (i n addition , only a poor quality education was given to
those who did pass through the system during this period (W orld Bank , 1981 (b): 106). 1n the late 1970s
the ratio of scientific and technical personnel to total manpower in the productive sector was low. Even
in chemicals and machinery manufacturing , the ratio in China stood at only 4.5% , compared to 5.2 % in
Brazil , 9.3% in Mexico and 2 1.1. % in the USA. Moreover , these data 'conceal the poor quality and outof-date character of much technical knowledge - the result of ten years of educational disruptions and
isolation form the rest of the world ... 1n relation to China's desire and need to
skilled manpower is inadequate' (W orld Bank ,

1981 的:

modernise~

its supply of

107).

Th e USSR had a vastly more developed pool of scientific and technical personnel than did China.

A consequence of the extremely poor record in utilising scientific skills to produce technical progress was
that the USSR allocated sufficient resources to enable the supply of scien

A major problem even for China'a primary and secondary education was the disruption caused
by the Cultural Revolution , which led to schools being c1 0sed across much of the country for two to three
years , and even when 出 ey reopened , ideological education took a high priority in the curriculum.
10

Table 3: Educational Achievements in China and the former USSR , 1978
No enrolled in
higher education
as % of population
aged 20-24

Adult 1i teracy
rate(% )

20

2

43

95

41

11

72

Industrial market
economles

100

89

37

99

China

93

51

India

79

28

8

36

USA

98

97

56

99

Austria

100

72

21

99

USSR

97

72

22

100

No. enrolled in
primary school as
% of age group

No enrolled in
secondary school
as % of age group

Low income
countries*

74

Middle income
countnes

66

Note *excluding India and China
Source World Bank , 1981
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the USA (U SCJEC , 1979: 745) . Th us , in addition to its large pool of highly qualified scientific workers ,
the USSR possessed an extremely large stock of moderately trained scientific workers.
A common consequence of the difficulties of central planning was that both countries possessed
a large stock of capital goods per unit of final produc t. Moreover in both cases , the capital were highly
unreliable , with a high propensity to break down. Furthermore compared to market economies there was
a much less reliability in obtaining spare parts from specialist producers. Th us a striking characteristic
of both systems was the high level of engineering ingenuity at all levels of the system.

Th is was

reflected , for example in the huge numbers of general purpose lathes , used to produce a wide range of
sp 紅e parts 出 at

in other economies would be purchased through the marke t.

Th is was extremely

inefficient , but it produced a widespread basic engineering capacity.
In neither case was the stock of scientists and engineers used well. The absence of the motive
force of competition and profit seeking greatly reduced the incentive of enterprises to undertake technical
progress and even led to resistance to technical progress suggested from above the enterprise. The
pervasive atmosphere of shortage led to a widespread 'seller' market' so that in both capital goods and
final consumption goods there was little incentive for enterprises to use available scientific ski I1 s to
improve product quality. In the belief that technical progress was a public good , a large part of scientific
capacities were located away from the enterprises. In the USSR in 1973 , for example , only about nine
percent of Soviet scientific workers were engaged in work in industrial enterprises , the remainder being
located in higher educational institutions , in the scientific academies or in the branch ministries and other
state agencies (U SCJEC , 1979: 729).

Motivation
A large array of factors combined to produce a workforce in both China and the USSR that was
operating much inside its capacity , even given the nature of the available capital stock.
In agriculture , fundamental difficulties arise with production units which employ a large number
of workers , such as the collective farm and the state farm. Th e special nature of the farm work process
and the associated difficulty of evaluating work performance means that it is extremely hard to obtain
dili

Th is is the main reason that is so rare under non-socialist agriculture to find units of production

which employ a large number of workers.
12

planning system found it impossible to obtain timely de1i very of needed inputs so as to keep the
production process running smoothly at full capacity. Consequently, the workpace was very uneven
throughout each production period.
Much has been written of the normally slow workpace and low work effort which resulted from
these factors. However, it is far from the case that this represented a fixed parameter of economic
activity. Rather, it represented a huge potential windfall gain if workers' motivation could be harnessed
through suitable policies. An important factor which was available to enable this force to be released was
the widespread disappointment with the standard of living attained after long years with high rates of
saving and investmen t. Although by the 1970s the absolute levels of the standard of living in China and
the USSR were very different , in both cases there was deep dissatisfaction with the poor results that had
been produced by the communist planned economy. Th e introduction of suitable incentive systems could
have released a greatly increased intensity of labour , and hugely raise output from existing resources.
c.

Entrepreneurship
China has a much longer tradition of entrepreneurship than Russia. China's medieval technical

revolution did not spring out of the heads of inventors independently of economic incentives. Mostly it
occurred through the response of producers to practical problems encountered in producing for the
marke t. As early as the tenth or eleventh century AD , China possessed a sophisticated economy , with
a highly developed market structure compared to the rest of the contemporary world. It was arguably
the world's mostly highly urbanised country until at least the late middle ages in Europe. Although China
did not make the breakthrough to a an Industrial Revolution along European lines , the growth of output ,
market systems and urban places continued over subsequent centuries. Whether or not one chooses to
call this development a process of emerging 'capitalist sprouts' , it is clear that China had a highly
developed entrepreneurial system for many centuries before the European Industrial Revolution. The
most advanced areas by the sixteenth or seventeenth century were those along the Eastern seabord , and
in the Lower Yangzi Valley.
China's capacity to respond strongly to the 'chal1 enge' of the West in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centu

13

Exchanges of London or New York and the Szechuanese market' (B ergere , 1981: 33).
China clearly possessed a powerful capitalist tradition , and the Chinese revolution occurred
relatively recently , in 1949. Th us , it can be argued that the memory of capitalism was still in the 1970s
very much al ive.
Th e Russian picture initially appears very much more disadvantageous. The Russian state itself

is a modern construct. As late

as 出 e

mid-fifteenth century , 'Russia' was a landlocked country of modest

size. Over much of the country there were severe natural barriers to the development of commerce and
production for the market: 'Th e fundamental and most stable feature of Russian history is the slow tempo
of her development , with the economic backwardness , primitiveness of social forms and low level of
culture resu 1ting from it.... Th e population of this gigantic and austere plain , open to eastern winds and
Asiatic migrations , was condemned by nature itself to a long backwardness' (Trotsky , 1977: 26). The
authoritarian state also presented serious obstacles to capital ist development through its rapacious
intervention in economic affairs 8 • Moreover , by 1914 , capitalist development had still

'的 yet

touched

little more then the hem of Russia's economic system. Th e patches of factory industry in the Leningrad
and Moscow districts were and in the south were no more than industrial "islands" in a vast agricultural
sea , bordered to the north by deep forests and to the south by mountain or desert' (Dobb , 1966: 35-6).
On top of this , the Soviet Union experienced almost sixty years under anti-capital ist Stal inist planning.
However , the reality is much more complex. It is true that large tracts of Russian Asia had very
limited economic development under Tsarism. However , a growing body of revisionist scholarship is
re-assessing capitalist development pre-1914. In European Russia pre-1860 capitalism was much more
advanced than was once supposed (see , e.g. Gatrell , 1986: 144-150; Blackwell , 1983). By the late
nineteenth

cenωry

several major centres of industrial and commercial activity had developed , often

building on extensive traditions going back several centuries. Th e Moscow Region was the most ancient
of these , being the centre of an extensive metallurgical industry which began with the formation of the
Muscovite state during the Mongol period: 'Generations of such activity provided a pool , not

See , e.g. Pipes , chapter 8, 'Th e missing bourgeoisie'.
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0

of what is to-day termed a "world city"... .Th e St Petersburg entrepreneurs were involved deeply in
foreign trade , but also in highly concentrated industries , with large working forces , corporate
organisation , and sophisticated technology' (B lackwell , 1983: 17).
It is true that the revolution in China occurred just 25 years before the beginnings of serious
reform of the Stalinist economy began. However , in the intervening period there were only limited
opportunities for individuals to practise their capitalistic skills. A prolonged 'two line struggle' affected ,
among other things , the very existence of the private sector as an ancillary to the socialist secto r. During
the co l1 ectivisation campaign of 1955-6 , during the Great Leap Forward and in the Cultural Revolution
in the mid-1960s , the private sector in the villages came under heavy attack as a 'snare both to poor
peasants and to party cadres who still had bourgeois aspirations' (W alker , 1965: 75). 'Capitalism' was
likened by the 'left' to a 'dog in the water to be beaten and drowned'. Such tight restrictions were placed
on rural commerce and associated activities that the number of people working in 'rural commerce , food
and drink services and material supply' fell from 2.8 million in 1957 to only around 0.7 million in the
late 1960s and early 1970s (SSB , ZGLDGZTJNJ , 1987: 80). In the cities , the number of individual
workers f1 uctuated wildly as the campaigns against the private sector , waxed and waned , fall ing from 8.9
million in 1953 to just 160 ,000 in 1956 , expanding to 2.3 million in 1963 , before shrinking stead i1 y to
just 150 ,000 in 1977 (SSB , ZGTJNJ , 1992: 97).
During the early phase of collectivisation in the USSR , the Soviet leadership crudely suppressed
the private sector in agriculture. However , the policies were very quickly revers'ed , and later formalised
in the model statute on collective farms (1 935). By the late 1930s a large proportion of Soviet livestock
were in private ownership , and the private sector was producing an important part of rural personal
income. The USSR had no subsequent attack on the private sector comparable to that in China. The
legal rural private sector was estimated to be producing around 25-30% of total agricultural outþut in the
early 1980s (Aslund , 1991: 155).
Th e Stalinist planned economy produces simultaneous shortages and surpluses without the

possibility legally to reconcile them through the m
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stolen materials and often employing many workers 9 • It is estimated that in the USSR in the 1970s
between thirty and forty percent of personal income came from the private secto r. Indeed , it may be
缸gued

that due to the pervasivenss of shortages , ordinary individuals had to be far more entrepreneurial

in the conduct of their daily lives than the bulk of secure wage earners in the Wes t.
Within the state sector of the Stalinist economies an army of people (talkachi , or 'pushers') was
involved on behalf of enterprises in scouring the country to obtain wanted inputs in exchange for
unwanted surpluses. In pre-1976 China the planning system produced such 'disconnection between supply
and demand that enterprises were forced to send people to many parts of the country to get the materials
出 ey

needed by personal connections , bartering and other unhealthy means. It was

estimated 出 at

every

day there were about three million people who were travelling in the country on an errand to purchase
materials' (Liu and

Wa嗯，

1984: 97).

In sum , it is hard to argue that China's reforms were more successful than those in the USSR
because the inherent capacities for entrepreneurial activity were greater than those in the USSR. China's
traditions of entrepreneurship are , self-evidently , of much greater antiquity than those of Russia , but so
are they of greater antiquity than almost all other major cultural areas in the world.

By the mid-

nineteenth century European Russia had made up a great deal of the leeway in both commerce and
industry. For different reasons , neither pre-revolutionary China nor Russia modernised in response to
the Western 'challenge' as rapidly as may have been possible under a different set ofpolicies. However ,
川

'second economy' continued more or less u 削 ated

sin叫he plan叫 economy

began to be put into

e叮叮 t

I

even during the years of Stalin's rule , and was a very important area of entrepreneurship. The Chinese
planned economy produced the same inherent tendency towards a large second economy. However , it
periodicaIl y had severe campaigns which greatly increased the risk attached to such activity , and I
consequen t1 y sharply reduced its relative importance in such periods.
d.

Industry

General
Th e problems resulting in Stalinist economies from treating the whole of industry as a single

factory are well known (see , e.g. Ellman , 1989 , and Kornai , 1980).

The planners obtain their

information not from a team which works towards a common national purpose and therefore tell the truth
about their productive capacities. Rather , information is provided to planners by self-interested agents ,
who have a strong incentive to provide dishonest information. Even if the information provided to the

9
For a detailed discussion of the many
USSR see , especially , Grossman , 1979.

di仔erent
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forms which the black economy could take in the

planners were honest , there would still be large difficulties stemming from the complexity of constructing
a national plan which attempts to replace the market entirely. Th e adverse economic consequences of
this system were reflected , inter alia , in the high degree of self-sufficiency at all levels , in 'investment
hunger' , in a pervasive tendency towards hoarding , in low product quality , in poor incentives for
technical progress , and in high energy intensity of production.
However , there existed many ways in which industrial performance might improve through the
introduction of relatively simple reforms , as long as the economies were not immediately exposed to the
full force of international competition. Such reforms might in principle begin a process of incremental
improvement so that the industrial sector might move towards making profits at world market prices.
If it were possible to introduce reforms that began to replace planning instructions with protìts
as the goal of industrial enterprises , then some aspects of the economic system might be able to begin to
improve , even in the absence of comprehensive price , ownership , labour and capital market reform .
Enterprises might begin -to be more demanding of input suppliers to provide better quality products. This
in turn could begin to reduce system losses through breakdown of machinery. Enterprises might be more
interested in providing the product mix that was liable to increase demand for their products. They might
become more concerned to select those construction companies that would complete construction work
more rapidly. Th ey might begin to be more interested in purchasing new equipment to operate in old
plant than in expanding plant as fast as possible. Th ey might begin to concern themselves about reducing
stocks of raw materials and final products. Instead of hoarding labour and capital they might begin to
analyse the impact on profits of extra demands for inputs and be prepared to allow workers to leave the
enterprise if they wished.
If it were possible to combine the introduction of a gradual shift towards the protìt motive with
gradual reform of the price system then profit seeking might move in a direction that increasingly
economised on scarce resources. Capital allocation , whether by administrative agents or through growing
marketisation , might increasingly be drawn to more profitable sectors of industry. Pressure w

Heavy industry bias
Th e extreme inefficiency with which the Stalinist economies used investment resources meant th at
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出 ey required a large amount of heavy industrial goods to produce a unit of final product

(f able 4). Th e

quality of much heavy industrial output , especially machinery , was below that required to compete on
world markets.

However , a large part of heavy industrial output in most economies consists of

intermediate inputs in which the product is more homogenous and quality is a less important element in
competitiveness lO • Th e high level of development of the heavy industrial sector represents a potential
windfall gain for reforming Stalinist economies. If the reforms , in the manner outlined above , were able
to generate gradual improvements in the efficiency with which intermediate inputs were used , then these
economies should be able to experience a period of growth with relatively low investment in the heavy
industries. Moreover , the capacity to produce large amounts of heavy industrial output should enable
them to be able to grow without quickly encountering a foreign exchange constraint on growth. In the
event that the reforming Stalinist economies did encounter a foreign exchange constraint through
limitations on their capacities to generate export earnings , then it might be advantageous to be able to use
domestic heavy industrial products , even though their quality might be somewhat below those available
on world markets.

Size Structure
An intentional emphasis on large plants in order to benefit from economies scale combined with
a high degree of in-house production of inputs produced a relatively large share of large plants in the size
structure of the Stalinist economies (Erlich , 1985).

Writing in respect to Soviet industry one critic

commented: 'Our factories have turned into the most "all purpose" , the most unspecialised. Striving to
have everything at hand and not depend on producers for trifles , the directors of enterprises "naturalise"
their economic operations... .I t is much easier to produce the needed nuts oneself than to arrange for their
delivery from specialised factories that often are non-existen t' (Smelyev and Popov , 1990: 118).
As the competitive process begins to take

e缸ect

in the reforming Stalinist economies , profit

seeking enterprises should begin to able to make greater profits by buying increasing amounts of their
inputs from specialist suppliers instead of producing them at high cost from workshops within the plant
A logical process would be for many of these in-house operations to become independent operational
units. Th ere ought in principle to be considerable efficiency gains from such a re-orientation of plant
structure.

Creating firms from ministries and plants
Th e firm is the central institution of capitalism. It is at this level that the competitive struggle

10
In the advanced industrial economies in the late 1970s around 70% of total industrial output was
composed of 'heavy' industry products , and of this over one half consisted of intermediate inputs
(chemicals , rubber , plastics , non-metalic minerals and building materials , metallurgical and metal mining ,
petroleum and coal extraction , and electricity (W orld Bank , 1981 (b): 90).

18

Table 4 Intermediate Inputs per Dollar of GNP (1979/1980)

Steel
(g rammes)

Sulphuric
acid
(grammes)

Cement
(g rammes)

Energy
consumpt lO n
(kilograms of coal
equivalent)

USSR

136

21

116

1. 49

China

146

31

319

3.21

USA

42

17

27

1. 16

West Germany

61

7

47

0.56

Japan

109

7

87

0 .4 8

Source World Bank , 1981(a) , and SSB , ZGTJNJ , 198 1.
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of capitaIi sm is most firmly rooted . Th e archetypical firm has been smalI or medium-scale. Such firms
numerically dominate industry in advanced capitaIi sm and in recent years their role has increased , mainly
due to technical progress.
However, small and medium sized firms usually owe their prosperity to the existence of a
competitive large scale sector in which large multi-plant corporations are the main actors:

'付)hey

played

a central role in creating the most technologicalI y advanced, fastest growing industries of their day.
Th ese industries , in turn, were the pace-se前ers of the industrial sector of their economies.. .[Th ey]

provided an underlying dynamic in the development of modern industrial capital ism' (Chandler, 1990:
593). Th e large multi-plant corporation has been a key element in the process of cost reduction and
technical progress. Such institutions have been able to benefit from economies of scale, associated with
reduction in unit costs from large plant size. In addition they have been able to benefit from economies
of 'scope' associated

wi出 reduced

transaction costs involved in the transfer of goods and services from

one operating unit to another (Chandler , 1990). Th ese relate to marketing , research and development ,
installation of equipment , credit provision to customers and after-sales service and repair (Chandler , 1990:
200). Huge corporations with tens or even hundreds of thousands of employees (e.g. Unilever , Siemens ,
Pepsico , General Electric , Philips , General Motors , Hoech 哎， Samsung , Rockwell International) stand at
the centre of the capitalist system.
In US manufacturing as a whole , large firms (those with over 500 employees) still account for
over 74% of total manufacturing sales (Acs and Audretsch , 1993: 70). In the UK the share of the top
100 firms in manufacturing output has remained remarkably stable over a long period of time , at around
two

fi的 s

of total net output value since the mid 1960s (H ughes , 1993: 31). In many small countries like

Switzerland, Sweden and Holland the role of large corporations is even greater: in these countries the top
20 firms alone in 1985 accounted for 60 , %, 67 %, and 95 % of total industrial employment respectively
(Scherer and Ross , 1990: 63).
Th ere are large potential efficiency gains for Stalinist industry if it can move away from an

arrangement in which the whole economy is treated as a single plant towards one in which the
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Table 5: Distribution of Employment by Size of Establishment(%)
Capitalist countries
Size of
establishment

Small type

Large type

Social ist countries

China

1950

1970

1950

1970

1950

1970

1989

10-100

40

35

23

20

17

11

13

101-500

30

33

30

30

25

23

31

501-1000

11

13

13

14

16

16

15

over 1000

19

19

34

36

42

50

41

Note 'Independent accounting enterprises ' only. In the absence of direct data for the 1970s this provides
a good approximation of the size distribution of Chinese industrial enterprises then , since there were then.
In 1978 independent accounting enterprises accounted for 96% of NVIO (SSB , ZGGYJJTJZL , 19491984 , 1985: 41-2.
Source Erlich , 1985 , and SSB , ZGGYJJTJNJ , 1991
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economies into companies of sizes appropriate to the economies of scale of the respective sectors , ought
in principle enable improvements in economic performance.

Technical progress
Both China and the USSR experienced extremely low returns in terms of civilian technical
progress from their investment in human capital in science. One reason was the isolation of scientific
research workers in institutions and universities. However , the more fundamental reason was the lack
of interest in industry in employing the skills of scientific workers to improve industrial performance
either directly in the plant or indirectly through acquiring the fruits of their research. Indeed , enterprise
managers had a strong interest in resisting technical progress , let alone attempting themselves to pursue
l t:

'In the USSR innovation has to be "introduced". Th e Russian
that it requires

e旺。此，

a push from above.

word ， νnedreniye ，

imp 1i es

In the West , on the contrary , one had

industrial espionage , and efforts had to expended to prevent one's rivals learning about
one's innovations. Th e reason for the contrast must be competition , which exists in the
West even in sectors (such as the chemical industry for instance) in which giant
monopolists may seem to be dominant; whereas in the USSR it is no accident that many
plays and novels feature the obstructionist director who resits innovation: he has very
litt1 e incentive to do otherwise' (Nove , 1983: 76).
By introducing the profit motive to industry , large increases in economic output could in principle
be achieved from existing scientific personnel. Even in relation to their level of income it is likely that
the potential for the USSR to reap windfall gains from this aspect of reform was considerably greater than
that for China.
A further important part of the unrealised scientific potential was accounted for by the large share

of expertise allocated to the military secto r. In both cases the share was extremely large. This reflected
on , the one hand , the frontline position of the USSR in the Cold War and , on the other hand , it reflected
the 'war on two fronts' against both the US and the Soviet Union that China fought from the late 1950s
up until the early 1970s. In the early 1980s it was estimated that Soviet defence expenditures amounted
to around 15 % of GNP , and that the defence sector absorbed 16% of domestic machinery production
(U SCJEC , 1983: 306). Moreover , the defence sector claimed a disproportionately large share of the best

resources (U SCJEC , 1982: 340). China's defence sector was much less advanced than that of the USSR
in the 1970s , with a much greater reliance on sheer numbers of military personnel. However , the share
of industrial resources preempted by the military sector was even greater than that in the USSR. It was
estimated 也 at

in 1980 China's defence sector accounted for no less than 21 % of total industrial output

(U SCJEC , 1975: 477). In both cases there existed a very large 'peace dividend' from the end ofthe Cold
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War which could release scientific and material resources for civilian use.
especially large if the end of the Cold War coincided

wi出 well-devised

Th is dividend could be

policies to introduce competition

to industry leading to the intensive use for making proits of scientific skills and capital stock formerly
tied up in the military sector.
Despite the 'turn to the Wes t' in the 1970s resulting in some increase in Soviet imports of foreign
technology , equipment imports still accounted for only around 2 % oftotal domestic equipment investment
(H anson , 1978: 31). A leading expert in the field concluded that Soviet technology imports had played

a 'limited' role in Soviet growth (H anson: 1978 , 43). Th e vast bulk of China's technology imports had
originated from the Soviet bloc in the 1950s. In the 1960s 'self reliance had become the watchword.. .and
imports of equipment and technology were reduced to the selective acquisition of the most advanced
technology. Th e stock of Soviet equipment was rapidly becoming obsolete and domestically produced
equipment was primitive'

(U SCJ 前，

1978: 311). Both China and the USSR possessed an especia lI y large

opportunity for technical catch-up , provided the foreign exchange could be generated to pay for
technology-enhancing imports. China was in a less favourable position than the Soviet Union to take
advantage of this opportunity , since its scientific capabilities had been so badly damaged during the
Cultural Revolution.
f.

Agriculture
Th ere were large and obvious differences between Chinese and Soviet agriculture in the 1970s.

China's land-person ratio was minuscule compared

to 出 at

of the USSR , and its level of mechanisation

of farm tasks was much lowe r. Output per person in the USSR was vastly above that in China 11 • This
gave the Soviet Union a large 'cushion' to its reform programme.
However , there were also fundamental similarities in the agricultural situation. The most obvious
was the institutional setting. The socialist economies all based their agricultural policies on the erroneous
assumption , following Marx and Lenin , that agriculture , like industry contained wide possibilities for
economies of scale in all aspects of the farm process. Th is was a centraI rationale behind the decision

11

Output per capita of different farm products in the USSR and China in 1985 (kilograms):
China
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gram
meat
milk
eggs
aquatic products
sugar
fruit
Source Department of Agriculture , 1989: 706-707

USSR

to collectivise agriculture: 'Such despoliation of human energies and labour as takes place in the small ,
individual peasant economy cannot last any longe r. If a transition were to take place from this splinter
economy to a socialised economy , productivity of labour could double and treble , human labour could
be saved two fold and threefold both of agriculture and for the human economy as a whole' (L enin ,
quoted in Baran , 1957: 275). In both cases , the basic unit of production was extremely large in terms
of the number of workers. In the Soviet Union in the 1970s the average kalkhaz contained around 500600 labourers (Nove , 1972: 242). In China the basic unit of organisation was either the production
brigade or the production team (rather than the much larger peoples commune). In the late 1970s they
contained on average 455 and 54 workers respectively (SSB , CSY , 1981: 135).
Th ere are deep problems with the collective and state farm method of farm organisation (s 侃， e.g.

Nolan , 1988). It is very unusual under capitalism to find farms with more than three or four workers:
in the USA in the 1960s there was an average of just 1. 9 workers per farm (Nolan , 1988: 4 1). The
reason is to be found mainly in the peculiar difficulty of labour supervision in agriculture.

The

difficulties arise from the sequential nature of tasks over the course of the agricultural cycle (making it
difficult to identify the labour contribution of individuals to a given piece of farmland) , the spatial
dispersion of work over a wide area (l eading , for example , to difficulties in evaluating the labour
requirements of

di 仔'erent

pieces of land) , and the large role played by weather changes , necessitating

f1 exible responses from workers.

The sum impact of these factors was to produce large managerial

diseconomies of scale (measured by the number of workers , not the amount of capital) in most aspects
of the direct tasks of cultivation , though there still exists large scope for economies of scale , and hence
benefit from co-operation , in the ancillary aspects of the farm process , such as research , irrigation , crop
spraying , processing , and marketing. Agriculture under capitalism is , typically , characterised by small
units of production in the main farm tasks , but with large amounts of co-operation in ancillary activities.
A further serious set of problems affected agricultural performance. These included the regular
issuance of inappropri
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1959-65 to over 20% in the 1970s , compared to around 5% in the USA (USCJEC , 1979: 40). In China
agricultural investment accounted for around 11 % of state investment in the early 1970s (L ardy , 1983:
130). However , a great deal of investment was organised and financed by collectives themselves , so that
its final share was considerably above this figure. Th e growth rate of the farm sector's purchase of
agricultural inputs was extremely rapid , averaging almost 12 % per annum from 1957 to 1978 (Nolan ,
1993: 245). Th e rural sector' s share of total steel products rose from 8 % in 1957 to 17 % in 1977 , and
its share of cement increased form 9% to 25% over these same period (Nolan , 1988: 60).
In both cases relatively simple institutional changes had the potential to produce large
improvements in

efficien句，

and to release labour and a much increased share of investment for

employment elsewhere in the economy. Th ese represented potentially very large windfall gains for the
reforming communist economy. Moreover , improvements in farm performance could have beneficial
effects on light industrial growth through the supply of industrial inputs , and on overall economic
performance through the incentive effect of improving an essential element in people's livelihood even
in a relatively advanced economy such as the USSR was in the 1970s. In addition , it might have
beneficial balance of payments effects through reducing food and raw material imports.
Th e most important and simplest institutional change is contracting farmland out to individual

households , allowing households to take the main decisions about organising the means of production ,
and permitting them to make the key decisions about saving and investment within the framework of a
stable tax environmen t. Th is 'Iand reform' alone should be able to reverse the profound managerial
diseconomies of scale associated with collective agriculture and state farms , and radically improve peasant
incentives. If such a reform were associated also with sirnple changes in the way in which farrn inputs
were supplied and with a move towards the profit motive in industry , then there would also be a
possibility for profit seeking farm households to begin to be more demanding in their selection of inputs
in respect both to their quality and type.
Th e largest problem is that of lurnpy farm inputs. Soviet agriculture'at first sight appears to have

been characterised generall
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maintenance of a large part of more lumpy inputs in the hands of profit oriented co-operatives or state
machinery and irrigation companies.
3.2

Government and politics

a.

Administrative capacity of the bureaucracy
Both China and the USSR had a long tradition of centralised bureaucratic rule. Th ey both had

a huge Party apparatus 12 , which was closely interwoven with the system of state administration. It
would be very difficult indeed to

argue 出 at

the Chinese bureaucratic apparatus or tradition of centralised

rule was weaker than that of Russia. lt would be hard also to argue to sustain an argument that the
Chinese communist party apparatus was any less corrupt or any more professiona l1 y effective than that
of 也 e

USSR in the late 1970s. lndeed , the Chinese Communist Party and administrative

been badly damaged during the Cultural Revolution decade.

apparaωs

had

Even more than usual in a communist

country promotions in China during this period had been based on ideological rather than professional
criteria (i. e. 'red'

rather 血泊 'expe此').

Th is bureaucratic apparatus has been regarded by most commentators as the major obstacle to

sensible reform policies in communist countries. Most observers have regarded it is as self-evident that
the bureaucracy would be deeply opposed to economic reform , since reform would deprive them of power
and status. Aslund (1 991: 14) summarises this approach as follows: 'A reform reduces the power ofthe
bureaucracy by definition and most of the administration will inevitably oppose reform. Th erefore , a
successful reform must break the power of the anti-reform bureaucracy... To break the power of the party
and state bureaucracy may be seen as the key problem of a reform.'
However , the possession of an effective , competent state bureaucracy is a central element in
explaining the rise of almost every successful industria1i sing country since Britain. There were two
logical possibilities to the problems of the old state apparatus.
unreformable ,

i 凶 erently

One was to regard it as hopelessly

opposed to any kind of reform measure and to destroy it. A second , reformist

approach was to attempt to change its goals and methods of operation. Th is would involve a gradual
process of professiona1i sation , making the organisation more youthful , introducing more rational ity rather
than quasi-re1igious principles into its ethical foundation , and giving the members of the apparatus a
centr

12
Th e Chinese Communist Party in the late 1970s numbered about 38 mi l1 ion , or around 3.5% of
the tot a1 population , while the Soviet Communist Party numbered about 18 mi l1 ion , or around 6.7% of
the total population.
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it. However , there is no reason to believe that the Chinese bureaucratic apparatus had any greater
capacity to be transformed successfully in this reformist way than did the Soviet one. Indeed , many
observers writing in the 1970s would have
b.

argued 出 at

the reverse was the case.

Mass demands for political reform
Political outcomes are far from a matter of choice by governments.

One important line of

argument is that the dramatic contrast in political outcomes in China and the USSR was not a matter of
policy choice but was , rather , an uncontrollable consequence of the fundamental difference in political
environment. Th e most important such propositions relate to mass demands for democracy on the one
hand and the strength of nationalist feeling on the othe r.

Mass demands for democracy
Th e Soviet Union in the late 1970s was , self evidently , a much more highly urbanised society

than was China. It also had a much more strongly developed interest in Western values among the
intellectual community. It is probable that in the 1970s- there was a more widespread hope in the USSR
that Western democratic institutions might be put into place than was the case in China.
However , the Soviet political system appeared to most observers both inside and outside the
country to be extremely stable. It had survived in relatively intact form since the 1920s without any
fundamental disruptions.

Th e system even in the post-Stalin and post-Krushchev period was sti l1

extremely repressive allowing very limited areas of individual freedom. Moreover , China's political
system had only recently been through a huge upheaval in the shape of the Cultural Revolution , which
had deeply damaged the communist party for several years , unleashing a period of widespread anarchy ,
for which there is no counterpart in Soviet history.

Moreover , the principaI actors in the CulturaI

Revolution had been millions of young people who had been urged by the country's leader to 'dare to
rebel' .
In the Soviet Union , hopes of fundamental political change may have been more widespread than
in China , but expectations of such change were much less. It was the policy decisions of Gorbachev in
respect to perestroika of the political

system 出 at

turned the strong hopes into ardent expectations. In the

sharpest contrast , there was a near consensus among the Chinese leadership that political democratisation
was not a part of the political agenda in the near future in China.

A series of campaigns against

'bourgeois' values attempted to reduce expectations of change among the politically active population.

Nationalism
In the 1970s both China and the USSR were huge multinational empires. However , the relative
size of the 'national minority' population is a major difference between the two countries. The nonRussian population accounted for around one half of the total Soviet population whereas the non-Han
population in China accounted for well under ten per cent of the total population. Once the minority
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nationalities began to pursue their demands for independence in a serious fashion in the USSR the
situation was more difficult to

control 出 an

would have been the case in China.

Successful market and income growth is the most powerful force leading to the disintegration of
ethnic di仔erences. In both cases the non-market Stalinist systems had kept the forces of nationalism intact
in a 'deepfreeze' beneath a veneer of new 'socialist man'. Th e national leadership of both countries
perpetuated a public propaganda myth that the 'nationality' question belonged to the pas t. ln both cases
the 'national minorities were disproportionately concentrated in more sparsely populated , remote ,
resource-rich regions. In both cases notional liberation movements had been brutally suppressed. If
anything , the severity of these struggles in recent times had been greater in China than in the USSR.
China fought major battles against the Uighur (Weiwuer) 'national minority' in Xinjiang province in
central Asia over a long period , and conducted a protracted and violent guerilla war against the Tibetan
independence movemen t.
In the 1970s in neither country was the expectation of national minority groups h igh. However ,
the policies pursued by the national leadership were strikingly different (see below). In the Soviet case
the environment of political perestroika greatly raised the expectation of national minorty groups , whereas
in China national policy makers repeatedly made it clear that attempts to break away from rule by Peking 1
would be repressed brutally.
c.

Leadership perspectives
Th e USSR entered the 1980s with an extremely aged leadership. Writing in 1983 , a leading

Soviet expert commented: Th e most striking characteristic of [the top leadership stratum] is its advanced
age.. .;the coming succession will inevitably bring about massive replacement of the leadership stratum ,
and will compress the turnover into a relatively short time span'

(B ial 缸，

1983: 400). The new generation

of leaders which came to power in the mid-1980s had grown up entirely during the Soviet period and had
not experienced the turbulence of the first phase of Soviet industrialisation. The bulk of their working
life had been conducted in the relative stability of post-war recovery , post-Sta1i nist growth and , finally ,
post-Krushchev stagnation.

Th ey had not personally experienced an economy and society in

disintegration ,
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these problems.
Th ey had no first hand understanding of a market economy. Th e USSR 's adversary in the Cold

War was the USA. , and the USA stood at the forefront of the consciousness of Soviet policy makers as
the c1 assic example of capitalist economics and politics. Moreover , American social science and funding
dominated thinking in non-communist politics and economics , from academic journals through to the
international institutions , notably the IMF and the World Bank. In the 1970s the mainstream of USdominated social science thinking moved even further towards an anti-state position. Only in the late
1980s and 1990s under the impact of the collapse of the USSR and the rise of China to add to the success
of Japan and the East Asian Newly Industrialising Countries , has the mainstream of American social
science begun to real ise

出 at

the role of the state is more complex than it was confidently portrayed as

being in the 1980s. Furthermore , the Soviet intellectual community as a whole was reluctant to consider
East Asia as having any relevance to their own policy formation. A chartiable view would suggest that
this is mainly on account of their historical relationship with China: 'As the leader of the Social ist bloc ,
most Soviet officials did not like the idea of copying the Chinese ... Until about mid-1986 the Chinese
reforms were bitterly attacked in the Soviet Union' (Goldman , 1992: 61). A less charitable , but probably
more accurate view , would attribute this to little short of racism 13 •

Most Russians were extremely

reluctant to believe that any of the East Asian countries , Japan included , were in any way superior to
them , and could have much to teach them.
Th us , the possibility that a strong , reforming communist party should in a one-party authoritarian

fashion lead a controlled transition to an economy which for the foreseeable future might combine the
virtues of plan and market in respect both to growth and distribution , did not gain the main ground of
political discourse in the USSR's reform debates. Instead , it remained a marginal ised perspective harking
back to the Soviet Union's own NEP in the 1920s. A powerful undercurrent of thinking at the highest
level of policy making quickly emerged , and soon became the mainstream , namely , that 'real' reform
meant moving fast down the American path of politics and economics. Opposition to this was rapidly
stigmatised as immoral , attempting to cl ing thr

13
Striking public examples ofthis are Solzhenytsin's Nobel Prize acceptance speech , which contains
references to the 'Yellow Peri l', and Stalin's contemptuous attitude towards the Chinese , recorded in
Kru shchev's memories.
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some of the elder statesmen did , indeed , die in the course of the reform years , key actors remained alive ,
and in one or two key cases , notably that of Deng Xiaoping , remained in possession of their critical
faculties despite advanced age. Most writers outside China in the course of China's reforms regarded
the continued power of China's 'gerontocracy' as an unequivocal 'bad thing' for the Chinese people.
Th ey were time and again contrasted with the fresh (albeit mos t1 y middle-aged) faces of the new

generation of Soviet leaders , such as Gorbachev , Shevardnadze , Yeltsin , Popov , and Sobchak. Th ese
were , in Mrs Th atcher's , words people with whom one could 'do business' in marked contrast to the old
dictators in Peking.
China's old generation had a11 experienced persona11y a market economy , in some cases , such as
Deng Xiaoping's , having lived abroad under impoverished circumstances.

No-one who lived in the

burgeoning capitalist economy of China's Treaty Ports before 1949 could fail either to be impressed with
the dynamic power of market forces , nor dismayed at the social inequalities and insecurity it produced.
Moreover , any perceptive observer could perceive the many ways in which well focused state action
might improve the performance of the economy , especially that of the vast countryside. Thus China's
leaders of Deng Xiaoping's generation were under no illusions that 'free markets' would magically solve
China's problems. Th ey had first hand experience of deep market fa i1 ure and did not make the mistake
of equating the operation of capitalism with a first year US student textbook's account of perfect
competlt lO n.
However , the generation which came to power in China in the late 1970s did not receive the

imprimatur of rule as simply the next in line in a chain of succession. On the contrary they had , mostly ,
fought against the dominant policies of the previous Maoist epoch , and suffered greatly for so doing.
Th ey had , mos t1 y , been victims of the 'Two Line Struggle'. Deng Xiaoping had been reviled during the

Cultural Revolution as the 'number two capitalist roader' , and had famously said 'it doesn 't matter if the
cat was black or white as long as it caught mice'. ln other words one should be pragmatic in one's
choice of economic policies , with their suitability being judged by whether or not they were , indeed ,
successful in promoting the productive forces and national prosperity. Chen Yun , who came to be
ca

Th e old men who returned to power in the late 1970s in China may be likened with those in the

Soviet Union in the 1920s who had championed the cause of a mixed economy under communist party
rule. Chen Yun had himself been liked to Bukharin , and the position of the dominant group of leaders
had in common the pragmatism in respect to economic policy of the Bukharinist wing of the Soviet
communist party in the 1920s. ln both the early 1950s and again in the early 1960s , China had pursued
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loosely NEP-type policies , and this group had been in the forefront in supporting such measures.
Th e ideology of this group was closer to that of a much wider current of thinking in political

economy in East Asia, stretching from Meij i J apan in the late nineteenth century, through to Sun Yatsen
and the Kuomintang (i nitially on mainland China, and subsequently in Taiwan) , through to South Korea
and Singapore since the 1950s. Th e dominant approach had been to view po 1i tical institutions in a
functional

w 旬，

regarding the best arrangement

as 出 at

which would more rapidly produce national

prosperity in a world of hostile international competition. 1n economic pol icy , the free market and
Stalinist planning were regarded as being of equal irrelevance. Th e broad approach owed much to that
of Friedrich Lis t. Th us , Chiang

Kaish 仗，

the leader of the Kuomintang , in the midst of his party's

struggle with the Chinese Communist Party wrote in 1947 'China cannot compete with the advanced
industrial nations. She must therefore adopt a protectionist policy with regard to foreign trade, and a
policy of economic planning with respect to her industrial developmen t. Private capital alone will not
be sufficient to operate on a large scale ,or to compete with the trusts and government operated enterprises
of foreign nations. Th is is the great weakness of laissez -faire economic theory ancl makes it unsuitable
for China' (Chiang , 1947: 279).

Economic policy was interpreted as inseparable from wider

considerations ofnational endeavour , with individual group interests firmly suborclinatecl to national goals:
'Westem economics is merely the study of private enterprise or of market transactions , whereas Chinese
economic theory is not confined to private enterprise or market transactions but is a combination of the
peoples livelihoods and national defense .... [E]conomics is the study of how to make the nation rich and
strong - to build a nation into a wealthy , powerful , healthy , and contented state. ln essence it is the study
of national economic development' (Chiang , 1947: 243 , and 248).
A striking illustration of the contrast between the Chinese and Soviet leaclersh ip perspective is
the nature of the reports written by the international institutions once they statred to again influence in
these two countries. Th ose produced by the IMF and World Bank for the USSR look very like standard
recommendations for stabilisation
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stock in trade elsewhere and were , indeed , so in their relationship with the USSR and Russia. As far as
the World Bank was concerned , a sort of schizophrenia developed , under which almost all those who
worked in the China department became convinced of the desirabil ity of a more pragmatic approach
towards

reform 出 an

that which was confidently recommended by other branches of the organisation.

Th e old men who returned to power in the late 1970s in China had lived through an attempt to

create a 'great leap forward' in political economy , such as was being recommended to Eastern Europe
and 出 e

USSR. In 1958 Mao had promised to Chinese people that a communist utopia could be created

overnight in China , and 出 at within a few years massive economic progress could be achieved on the basis
of the changed socioeconomic relationships. Th e Great Leap ended in disaster , with a massive collapse
in output and tens of millions losing their lives through starvation. Th is made them deeply sceptical of
policy advice such as that given to the Soviet leadership by Western and internal advisors , suggesting that
radical policy changes could quickly produce excellent results. Moreover , China was still in the 1970s
an extremely poor country and the leadership was deeply aware that policy errors could still create
disastrous results. In sharp contrast to the Soviet leadership , which could not conceive that things might
quickly get worse , the Chinese leadership's personal experience combined with the country's poverty
made them to be highly risk averse in choosing policies. Th eir goal was not to quickly create the wealth
of the USA or Western Europe , but rather to produce some improvement through cautious , experimental
change. As long as China gradually became more prosperous ,then the reforms would be deemed to have
worked; 'bu pa man , jiu pa zhan' ('Don't worry about going forward slowly as long as you 're going
forward').
Th e Soviet leadership had experienced a lifetime of political stability. They could not imagine
出 at

their country could be plunged into political turmoil by over-rapid political reform. However , the

aged Chinese leadership had personally experienced the anarchy of political life for much of the
'Republican' period. Th e hopes of more Western-oriented Chinese intellectuals for the establishment of
1911 a stable democratic system in China

a玩er

the 1911 Revolution were dashed as China entered.' the

pro
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Writing at the beginning of the Soviet reform process , Gorbachev expressed his hopes as follows :
Th e main idea of the January [1986] Plenary Meeting-as regards ways of accomp 1i shing

the tasks of perestroika and protecting society from a repetition of errors of the past-was
the development of democracy.

It is the principal guarantee of the ireversibiity of

perestroika. Th e more socialist democracy there is , the more socialism we will have.
Th is is our firm conviction , and we will not abandon it. We will promote democracy in

the economy , in politics and within the Party itself. Th e creativity of the masses is the
decisive force in perestroi切， there is no other more powerful force
Writing early in China's reform process Deng in 1979 presented the Chinese leadership's view
of the relationship between

di旺erent

aspects of the reform process as follows :

At present , when we are confronted with manifold difficu 1t ies in our economic life which
can be overcome only by series of readjustments and by consolidation and reorganisation ,
it is particularity-necessary to stress publicly the importance of subordinating personal
interests to collective ones , interests of the part to those of the whole , and immediate to
long-term interests...... [T]alk about democracy in the abstract will inevitably lead to the
unchecked spread of ultra-democracy and anarchism , to the complete disruption of
political stab i1 ity and unity , and to the total failure of our modernisation programme. If
this happens then the decade of struggle against Lin Biao and the Gang of Four wi1l have
been in vain , China will once again be plunge into chaos , division , retrogression and
darkness , and the Chinese people will be deprived of all hope (Deng , 1979: 55).

Conclusion
Despite some important

di叮叮 ences ，

both the former USSR and China possessed huge catch-up

possibilities , as did most of the former Stalinist countries. Th e main reason for the contrast in outcome
in China and the USSR is the difference in policies selected in respect both to narrowly economic issues ,
and to the relationship between economic and political change. Th e contrast in pol icies pursued was the
result of complex historical factors leading to fundamentally different approaches towards the task of
transforming the Stalinist system14 •

14

For more deta i1 ed discussion of these issues see Nolan , 1993 , and Nolan , forthcoming.
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